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In 1898, the year Americans first sailed forth to fight in other countries to
protect purported victims of imperialism, A. V. Dicey steamed into Harvard
University to deliver his lectures on Law and Public Opinion in England.
Like William Blackstone, Vinerian Professor before him, Dicey deployed a
number of memorable epigrams to capture what seemed basic truths of his
day. Dicey's assertion that 'protection invariably involves disability'"
appeared to state the obvious to Americans at the turn of the century.
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1. A. V. Dicey, Lectures on Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth
Century (London, 1905) 150 n. 1. Dicey thought this point 'elementary' but 'worth
insisting upon'. My friend Carol Weisbrod of the University of Connecticut School of
Law first alerted me to this passage. The nexus between law, public opinion and the
relative protection of the flag and the Constitution as they travelled the globe was
obvious to Finley Peter Dunne. Indeed, his most famous saying was, 'No matter
whether th' constitution follows the' flag or not, th' Supreme Court follows th' iliction
returns'. Finley Peter Dunne, 'The Supreme Court Decisions' in Elmer Ellis, ed.,Mr.
Dooley at His Best (Hamden, 1938) 77. But long after San Juan Hill and Manila Bay,
the vexing issue of how much protection the flag, the Constitution, or some combination
thereof should provide individuals and corporations overseas still confused United
States Supreme Court Justices as well as the rest of the population. I hasten to reassure
that this subject is not one I wish to explore here.
For recent work considering Blackstone's great influence in the United States, see,
e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (Cambridge, 1985) 15
('the Commentaries rank second only to the Bible as a literary and intellectual influence
on the history of American institutions'); R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice
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In this essay I will consider how the United States Supreme Court embraced
Dicey's epigram and translated it into decisions during the tenures of Chief
Justices Fuller and White about the capacity of the individual in the United
States to contract and care for himself. By focusing on the Court from 1888
to 1921, I do not seek to demonstrate again that there is and always has been
a chasm between law in books and law in action. Nor do I make any claim
that paternalism was a new problem when Fuller succeeded Waite, or a
problem that had been resolved in 1921 when Taft took the enlarged seat he
coveted at the center of the Court. My thesis is that under the guise of a
formalistic, unitary vision of categories such as individual autonomy and
citizenship, the Justices subdivided and manipulated legal doctrine about
suitable protection in a way that arrogated tremendous discretionary power
to themselves. In proclaiming both their authority and their ability to dis-
tinguish between people as individuals and as members of groups, the judicial
brethren became the paternalistic patriarchs.
In considering efforts to restrict what judges viewed as debilitating
paternalism masquerading as protection, I will use the following as a
definition of paternalism: a decision made by someone for someone else,
allegedly for the latter's own good. Paternalism relates directly to Dicey's
formulation. Can one have protective legal intervention without making
some statement about the disability of purported beneficiaries?
To the modern eye, or to even a mediocre anagrams player, there is an
obvious connection between the loathed concept 'paternalism' and the more
neutral, if not positive, notion of 'parentalism'. Yet paternalism remains one
of our most powerful pejoratives.
Lochner v. New York, 2 nearly always invoked to categorize the entire era,
is still shorthand in constitutional law for the worst sins of subjective judicial
activism.3 I am not here concerned with all of the ways in which Lochner
itself may have been anomalous, 4 but I am interested in the concept of
Joseph Story (Chapel Hill, 1985) 40-43, 243-46; Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused:
Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven, 1975) 16; Dennis R. Nolan, 'Sir
William Blackstone and The New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact',
51 New York University Law Review 731 (1976). For general consideration of A.V.
Dicey, see Richard A. Cosgrove, The Rule of Law: Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian Jurist
(London, 1980) and a provocative review, David Sugarman , 'The Legal Boundaries
of Liberty: Dicey, Liberalism and Legal Science', 46 Modern Law Review 102 (1983).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, 'The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade',
82 Yale Law Journal 920, 944 (1973) (Ely actually uses 'Lochnering', but I fid
'Lochnerizing' more felicitous).
4. The best-known exception prior to Lochner was Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898), which allowed Utah to limit to ten hours the maximum miners could work per
day, for reasons of health and safety. Less well known are several other decisions in
which the Court announced, for example, that '[it is within the undoubted power [of
Congress] to restrain some individuals from some contracts'. The author of this
statement was none other than Justice David Brewer, writing for a unanimous Court in
Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895). That decision upheld a criminal
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autonomous individualism inherent in the notion of liberty of contract which
was at stake in Lochner. That legal idea affords a means to examine how
true the Court was to prevailing laissez-faire principles. 5
Grant Gilmore's observation that '[t]he few people . . . who have ever
spent much time studying the judicial product of the period have been
appalled by what they found' 6 is in itself an intriguing challenge. Moreover,
a sampling of judicial decisions involving governmental protection of those
deemed unfit shows that the Justices were caught in a bind of their own
creation, forced to perform gymnastic feats to find and hold the line between
legal spheres they claimed they were obliged to separate. The Justices
manipulated the deductive pretensions of their categorical approach to
people as individuals and as members of groups in several ways. While
acting aggressively to protect the interests of corporations, 7 which were
conviction imposed on a lawyer for charging more than the statutory maximum allowed
for processing a widow's pension under the Dependent Pension Act of 1890. See also
Holmes's statement in Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U.S. 593, 598 (1905) ('There
is no doubt that [freedom of contract] may be limited where there are visible reasons for
public policy for the limitation.'); Cantwell v. Missouri, 199 U.S. 602 (1905).
Decisions also permitted states to forbid or severely restrict access to cigarettes, liquor
and oleomargarine, see, e.g. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900); James Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) and
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) are additional well-known exceptions to the
traditional understanding of the Lochner doctrine; these decisions allowed states to act
with explicit paternalism toward women. See generally David P. Currie, 'The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910',
52 University of Chicago Law Review 324 (1985).
5. Laissez-faire itself is, of course, not a concept that is easily defined. See Lionel
Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy
(London, 1952); Calvin Woodard, 'Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from
Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State', 72 Yale Law Journal 286 (1962). As with 'Social
Darwinism' and 'formalism', whose heyday laissez-faire is often thought to have
shared, much of the definition must rely on context. See generally P.S. Atiyah, The
Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979).
6. Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven, 1977) 60.
7. A generation ago, Robert McCloskey suggested that during this era '[tlhe major value
of the Court ... was the protection of the business community against government'.
Robert McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago, 1960) 105. Among the best
of additional earlier sources for this view, see Sidney Fine, Laissez-Faire and the
General-Welfare State (Ann Arbor, 1956); Clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the
Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F.
Dillon upon American Constitutional Law (Berkeley, 1954); Robert McCloskey,
American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise (Cambridge, 1951); Richard
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Philadelphia, 1944); Benjamin R.
Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez-Faire came to the Supreme Court
(Princeton, 1942) [hereinafter cited as Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution]; Edward S.
Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court (New Haven, 1934); Matthew Josephson,
The Robber Barons (New York, 1934); Max Lerner,'The Supreme Court and American
Capitalism', 42 Yale Law Journal 668 (1933).
McCloskey's observation still seems generally accurate today, even if we recall what
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proclaimed to have equal rights as persons, they acted with paternalistic
condescension toward others, such as women, Indians, and sailors, whose
claims for equal treatment they viewed as contrary to the natural order.
Simultaneously, however, the Court disabled some citizens, such as blacks,
by approaching their claims with extreme arms-length formality, declaring
that black men already had achieved full legal equality.
The paradox of paternalism-encouraging and applying some form of
protection while excoriating and invalidating others-may also fill some of
the void left by the shrinking of the orthodox view of laissez-faire
constitutionalism. There has been considerable recent scholarly debate about
the extent of Social Darwinism in late nineteenth century America. Indeed,
David Hollinger quipped, 'Social Darwinism can now claim a dubious
honor: that it has been shown not to have existed in more places than any
other movement in the history of social theory'.8 Yet the avoidance of
paternalism was an appealing surrogate for more explicit Social Darwinist
rhetoric: 9 whatever terminology was used, legal materials from the period
Charles Beard used to tell his students: the historian's 'best equipment' is to remember
that 'the very opposite of accepted faith may be true' (quoted in Ellen Nore, 'Charles
A. Beard's Act of Faith: Context and Contest', Journal of American History 66 (1980)
850).
Standouts within the recent work refining or redefining our understanding of the legal
history of the period are Charles W. McCurdy, 'Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of
Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
1863-1897', Journal of American History 61 (1975) 970; Michael Les Benedict,
'Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism', Law and History Review 3 (1985) 293; John E. Semonche,
Charting The Future: The Supreme Court Responds to a Changing Society (Westport,
1978). For an overview of the era, see Alexander M. Bickel and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.,
History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Judiciary and Responsible
Government (New York, 1984).
There is a generational pattern, of course, to today's revisions of revisionists; now
scholars search for order in the period roughly from 1880 to 1920 and some profess
little faith that we would know a Progressive or a robber baron if we saw one. (For a
helpful historiographic overview, see Daniel T. Rodgers, 'In Search of Progressivism',
Reviews in American History 10 (1982) 113. See also Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for
Order, 1877-1920 (1967).)
Of course, Willard Hurst and his oeuvre blazed the legal history trail for these and
many other issues. Though this paper certainly does not show it adequately, particularly
since it concentrates on doctrinal developments in Supreme Court decisions, I am
personally very much in Willard's and Frances's debt. In addition to many other
kindnesses, they allowed my family and me to use their home-and Willard's office-
during the University of Wisconsin Legal History Workshop in the summer of 1982
while I worked on this paper.
8. David A. Hollinger, 'Comments on Papers by Sharlin and Wall' in 'Symposium on
Spencer, Scientism and American Constitutional Law', Annals of Science 33 (1976)
476.
9. The recent debate about terminology, in particular about Social Darwinism and the
influence of Herbert Spencer, is largely the result of revisionist attacks on Richard
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, supra note 7. Examples of that
attack include Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie (New York, 1970); Robert C.
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from the 1880s into the 1920s suggest that combating paternalism was a core
concern among judges and lawyers.
Americans need not have read or believed all of Herbert Spencer's Social
Statistics, of course, to fear governmental regulation and to celebrate the
autonomy of vigorous, manly citizens free of invidious, paternalistic
coddling. As Charles Sanders Peirce put it, in an age pervaded by a
'dominant gospel of greed', men 'seemed to relish a ruthless theory'. o It
was a period in which the great race of life, premised somehow on the notion
of an equal start, was a dominant American image. The tendency to harden
this egalitarian image into ruthlessness gained strength from innumerable,
mutually enforcing influences, including bedrock Calvinist values, Ben
Franklin-like homilies, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s bitter deference to the
cosmos, and the muscular Christianity of the period, which promoted the
quest for manliness and godliness in the gymnasium, on distant battlefields,
and in legal and economic combat.
Robert Gordon recently noted that Americans came to be 'obsessively
judge-centered"' in the late nineteenth century; I will explore a few
elements of what that obsession might have entailed. In particular, I will
discuss the incoherence of anti-paternalism, which was a basic facet of the
Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought
(Philadelphia, 1979) and the Symposium on Spencer, supra note 8. As this essay makes
clear, I am not fully persuaded by arguments such as that by Wall about what
conclusions properly may be drawn from the paucity of explicit citations to Spencer,
ibid., particularly when anti-paternalism could carry much of the Social Darwinist load,
as it did, for example, in the brief for appellants in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), quoted by Wall at 471. For a good compendium with useful introductory
essays, see R. Jackson Wilson, ed., Darwinism and the American Intellectual
(Homewood, 1967).
10. Quoted in an excellent book, R. Jackson Wilson, In Quest of Community: Social
Philosophy in the United States, 1860-1920 (New York, 1968) 56. For similar ideas
about the thought of Holmes and Langdell, see Robert W. Gordon, 'Holmes' Common
Law as Legal and Social Science', 10 Hofstra Law Review 719, 722-23 (1982) (tendency
of the age 'to treat the world as a hard object gradually being discovered by means of
the suppression of human subjectivity'); Thomas C. Grey, 'Langdell's Orthodoxy', 45
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 1 (1983) (impact of analogy to geometry).
For fine examples of the outpouring of important recent work on the period and its
dominant motifs, see John L. Thomas, Alternative America: Henry George, Edward
Bellamy, Henry Demarest Lloyd and the Adversary Tradition (Cambridge, 1983); Robert
M. Crunden, Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievement in American Civi-
lization 1889-1920 (New York, 1982); Stuart Creighton Miller, 'Benevolent Assimili-
ation': The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven, 1982);
James C. Whorton, Crusaders for Fitness: The History of American Health Reformers
(Princeton, 1982).
11. Robert W. Gordon, 'Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American En-
terprise, 1870-1920', in Gerald L. Geison, ed., Professions and Professional Ideologies
in America, 1730-1940 (Chapel Hill, 1983) 70-110; see generally Loren P. Beth, The
Development of the American Constitution, 1877-1917 (New York, 1971); Thomas K.
McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, 1985); Duncan Kennedy, 'Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication', 89 Harvard Law Review 1685 (1976).
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theory which produced countless examples of judicial ruthlessness in a
crusade to root out legislative or executive paternalism, and to eliminate
excessive protection for the downtrodden by our lower court judges. The
United States Supreme Court played only one part in the story, of course.
The highest state courts generally competed with one another for the starkest
application of freedom of contract and the truest belief in laissez-faire
ideology. State courts probably had the most immediate impact and did
much to shape public consciousness about legal doctrine. State court
decisions invalidating legislative aid to victims of fires and floods, per-
ceived as overly paternalistic, joined holdings striking down such legislative
coddling as aid to the blind, competitive merit scholarships for a state
university, and standardized scales and scrip laws for miners and factory
workers. There is something to Charles Warren's assertion, after he
surveyed all the United States Supreme Court's decisions about state police
powers from 1887 to 1911, that '[t]he National Supreme Court, so far from
being reactionary, has been steady and consistent in upholding all state
legislation of a progressive type'. 12 Moreover, we cannot know if, had they
been polled, nearly all Americans-or even nearly all native-born, white
male Americans-might have enthusiastically endorsed particular United
States Supreme Court decisions or even the general pattern of such
decisions. 13
My claim is narrower and necessarily more impressionistic. In pursuit of
12. Warren's articles reporting the results of his survey of 560 Supreme Court decisions
from 1888-1911 bore such titles as 'The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme
Court' and 'A Bulwark to the State Police Power', 13 Columbia Law Review 294 and
667 (1913). In his famous two-volume history of the Supreme Court, Charles Warren,
The Supreme Court in United States History (Boston, 1926) 742-44. Warren updated
his survey to include such decisions as Adair and Coppage but he held firm to his
conclusion. Warren's sampling technique is subject to some criticism-e.g., police
power decisions were not the only source of restrictive constitutional holdings, as
developments in doctrinal categories such as Contract Clause and Commerce Clause
make clear-but his point is too often overlooked. It appears that Warren himself may
have had a change of heart or head about the issues he surveyed. As a young man,
Warren wrote a broadside condemning Massachusetts for granting pensions and for
otherwise 'taking public money for private uses under the guise of charity'. Charles
Warren, 'Massachusetts as a Philanthropic Robber', 12 Harvard Law Review 316, 318
(1898).
Lochnerizing did not really arrive until after World War I. For a handy scorecard of
that doctrine's impact during the 1920s, see Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and
the Supreme Court (Cambridge, 1938).
13. William Jennings Bryan's attack on the federal judiciary during the tumultuous
presidential campaign of 1896 and Theodore Roosevelt's vehement appeal for popular
recall of state judicial decisions in the 1912 campaign do indicate that capable
politicians believed their attacks on judicial decisions might create popular campaign
issues. The fact that these presidential candidates lost does not prove popular support
for their judicial targets; it is impossible to measure a national obsession with precision.
See Stephen Stagner, 'The Recall of Judicial Decisions and the Due Process Debate',
24 American Journal of Legal History 257 (1980). The same journal issue also contains
interesting related articles, Walter F. Pratt, 'Rhetorical Styles on the Fuller Court', at
189 and Charles C. Goetsch, 'The Future of Legal Formalism', at 257.
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an element of the mentalitg or consciousness of legal opinion-makers who
gained professional ascendancy from the Gilded Age into the early Jazz
Age-men from a cohort sharply reduced in numbers by the Civil War and
perhaps hardened by it as well-I will consider the legal construct of the
autonomous individual by focusing upon judicial decisions which added to
or subtracted from that legal fiction. The Justices' mathematical machina-
tions allowed them to become the nation's ultimate paternalists, even as they
devoted themselves tenaciously to rooting out paternalism whenever they
perceived it. The manipulability of the paternalism concept in constitutional
law after the end of Reconstruction and the paradoxical results of such
manipulation remain largely unexplored. It is revealing to consider to what
extent those already on top benefited and those on or near the bottom
suffered as a result of the process through which Justices made their choices.
Several themes emerge from scrutiny of a series of relatively obscure
Supreme Court decisions handed down when laissez-faire thought was
dominant. First, I respond briefly to recent legal history revisionists as I
examine the breakdown of the notion of unified American citizenship. Then,
confining my discussion largely to enforcement of contracts through a focus
on thirteenth amendment challenges, I explore what judges seem to have
meant by individual freedom. Finally, I argue that paternalism provided a
convenient, almost infinitely distensible target: it enabled the Justices to bull
their way through complexities in order to constitutionalize their anti-
paternalistic notions and to act as if their ideas had been deduced from some
deep structure of constitutional liberty.
In recent years, historians have begun to focus on the elusive concept of
paternalism largely but not exclusively in the context of slavery. 14 A series
of snapshots taken from Supreme Court decisions about the thirteenth
amendment, however, involves not only black people, as we would expect,
but also a more varied cast of characters. In fact, it is reminiscent of Peter
Pan.' 5 Sailors, Indians, and others often considered eternal children found
themselves before the Supreme Court in thirteenth amendment disputes.
14. The pathbreaking work is Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll (New York, 1974)
and it is criticized in James Oakes, The Ruling Race (New York, 1982). See also, e.g.,
William S. McFeely, Yankee Stepfather (New Haven, 1968), in which McFeely
pursues the theme in the context of the Freedmen's Bureau; Herman Belz, A New Birth
of Freedom (Westport, 1976) and Herman Belz, Reconstructing the Union (Ithaca,
1969), considering the tension between paternalism and individualism in Congressional
goals as the Civil War ended. See also Janet Sharp Hermann, The Pursuit of a Dream
(New York, 1981), a fascinating chronicle of an Owenite experiment on a Mississippi
plantation owned' by Jefferson Davis's brother, who sold it after the Civil War to the
former slaves who had worked the fields and cotton gins. For important recent
considerations of paternalism moving beyond slavery and its immediate aftermath, see
e.g., James M. McPherson, The Abolitionist Legacy (Princeton, 1975); David
Montgomery, Beyond Equality (New York, 1967). For a useful study of English
varieties, see David Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England (New
Brunswick, 1979). Cf. Richard Sennett, Authority (New York, 1980).
15. J.M. Barrie's Peter Pan was first performed in London in 1904. The portrait of Wendy
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I. Setting the Stage
When lame-duck President Cleveland nominated Melville W. Fuller for
Chief Justice in 1888, Fuller faced vigorous opposition from Republican
senators who feared for the fruits of the Civil War victory under the
constitutional guardianship of 'disloyalists' like Fuller. 16 But Fuller had the
advantage of being 'the most obscure man ever appointed chief justice'. 1 7
Moreover, he seemed quite safe on the issue of paternalism. In a book
review for Chicago's fledgling literary magazine, The Dial, Fuller had
written: 'Paternalism, with its constant intermeddling with individual
freedom, has no place in a system which rests for its strength upon the
self-reliant energies of the people." 8 This widely-shared, if not hackneyed,
sentiment coincided with the views of Cleveland and most Democrats; it was
also not terribly far removed from the proclamations of many Republicans. ' 9
The legal harvest of Civil War reforms in constitutional amendments and
civil rights statutes largely had been lost already. A remarkable string of
Supreme Court decisions either invalidated or narrowed to the point of
oblivion the constitutional commands and statutory protections enacted
during the first decade after the war. 20 In the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, the
as housewife, who believes that 'Father knows best', is particularly striking. But that
is another story.
16. Willard L. King, Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice of the United States, 1888-1910
(New York, 1950) 120. Senator George F. Edmunds (R.-Vt.) led the opposition to
Fuller from his base as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee; he was able to
discover actions by Fuller during the Civil War that smacked of Copperhead
sentiments. Nevertheless, Fuller was confirmed by a 41 to 20 vote. See generally ibid.
at 114-24.
17. Ibid. at 114, quoting the Philadelphia Press. For a somewhat similar description of
White, see Robert B. Highsaw, Edward Douglass White: Defender of the Conservative
Faith (Baton Rouge, 1981).
18. Willard L. King, Melville W. Fuller, supra note 16 at 90.
19. For example, The Nation in 1887 praised President Cleveland for his 'firm and
pronounced stand against paternalism in government' in his refusal to allow federal
drought and flood relief, and for his veto of what The Nation dubbed the 'Pauper
Pension bill'. The Nation 44 (March 10, 1887) 202. Cleveland had given the country
the important lesson that 'though the people support the government, the Government
should not support the people'. Ibid. Cleveland repeatedly sounded the antipaternalism
theme, as he did in his veto of the Texas Seed Bill on February 16, 1887, when he
warned that federal aid to drought-stricken Texas farmers 'encourages the expectation
of paternal care on the part of the government and weakens the sturdiness of our
national character, while it prevents the indulgence among our people of that kindly
sentiment and conduct which stregthen the bonds of common brotherhood'. George F.
Parker, ed., The Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland (New York, 1892) 450.
See generally Morton Keller, Affairs of State (Cambridge, 1977); R. Hal Williams,
Years of Decision (New York, 1978).
20. Compare, e.g., Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872); United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United
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Supreme Court declared that black citizens had already shaken off the
effects of slavery, noting that their progress was now such that they should
'take the rank of a mere citizen' and cease to be the 'special favorites of the
laws'.21 By the time Fuller reached the bench, the Court had declared that
corporations also were to enjoy fourteenth amendment protection. 22 Thus
whites, blacks and corporations were considered self-sufficient equals
before the law. Judges would ensure formal equality: no favoritism would be
allowed, and class legislation was unconstitutional. 23 Paternalism, a most
insidious sort of favoritism, was anathema.
In 1888, therefore, American citizenship appeared to be a clear concept.
There were exceptions, of course, such as Indians. 24 Moreover, distinctions
between civil and political rights explained why female citizens could be
treated differently in certain spheres. 25 Social rights constituted still another
realm, a realm government could not enter.26 Yet contemporary descriptions
of citizenship by late nineteenth century Americans inextricably linked and
often equated citizenship with self-sufficiency, manhood, and individualism.
Despite a common assumption that Congress was almost moribund during
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Fuller and his colleagues often
confronted legal claims involving federal legislation which Congress en-
acted despite frequent congressional deadlocks produced by evenly-
matched, loyal party alignments, antiquated rules, and the waning of reform
impulses following the Panic of 1873 and the Compromise of 1877. Still
more legislative activity took place on the state level. 27 This increase in
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 699 (1883) with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1879). The Court was somewhat more willing to allow government intervention in
matters concerning the franchise. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884).
21. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
22. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (dictum);
Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888) (holding that corporation
was a person for purposes of fourteenth amendment).
23. See, e.g., Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27
(1885). For a most useful treatment of the implications of this theme, see Richard S.
Kay, 'The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873-1903', 29 Buffalo Law
Review 667 (1980). Its ramifications in the realm of due process are somewhat better
known. See generally C. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts, supra note 7.
24. Elk v. Williams, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
25. See, e.g, Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875); Bradwell v. State, 83
U.S. (15 Wall.) 130 (1872).
26. Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883), in which the Supreme Court declared that
'it would be running the slavery argument into the ground' to hold that the thirteenth
amendment guaranteed non-discriminatory practices in public theaters, hotels and the
like.
27. See, e.g., Loren P. Beth, The Development of the American Constitution, supra note
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legislation combined with other factors to undermine the monochromatic
vision of citizenship. Nevertheless, the idealized American citizen, able to
care for himself, remained a pervasive image.
Indeed, in 1889 Lord Bryce reported in The American Commonwealth
that 'so far as there can be said to be any theory on the subject in a land
which gets on without theories, laissez aller is the orthodox and accepted
doctrine in the sphere both of Federal and State legislation' 28 Yet Bryce
emphasized the total inaccuracy of this theory. He wrote: 'Nevertheless the
belief is groundless. The new democracies of America are just as eager for
state interference as the democracy of England, and try their experiments
with even more light-hearted promptitude.' 29 Though in many respects
Americans tolerated legislative interference with personal autonomy more
than did their English counterparts, Bryce observed that 'few but lawyers
and economists have yet become aware of it, and the lamentations with
which old-fashioned English thinkers accompany the march of legislation
are in America scarcely heard and wholly unheeded'. 3o But American
judges were poised to listen, to hear, and to react to their own lamentations
and to do so with authority and an American accent.
We now know that there was a large gap between lawyerly exhortations
to avoid paternalism and the willingness of judges to resist legislative
interventions on behalf of the citizenry. Moreover, the most striking
pronouncements invalidating protective legislation were concentrated in
state courts. 3' Recent scholarship suggests that even Justice Stephen J. Field
occasionally rejected laissez-faire in the 1880s and 1890s, and that Justice
David Brewer was not such a totally doctrinaire fellow after all. 32 We also
have begun to recognize that realist roots can be found even within the
11; David J. Rothman, Politics and Power (Cambridge, 1966); R. Hal Williams, Years
of Decision, supra note 19; Morton Keller, Affairs of State, supra note 19.
28. James Bryce, The American Commonwealth 3 vols. (London, 1889) ii: 408.
29. Ibid. at 409. Bryce supplied charts and summaries of 'recent legislation tending to extol
state intervention and the scope of the penal law' to prove that Americans spoke one
way and acted quite another concerning government intervention.
30. Ibid. at 410.
31. See generally Clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts, supra note 7; Roscoe
Pound, 'Liberty of Contract', 18 Yale Law Journal 454 (1909).
32. Field was 'the doyen of conservatives on the postwar Court', according to Morton
Keller, Affairs of State supra note 19 at 366, but even Field has been 'rehabilitated'
somewhat-if one favors government intervention-in Charles W. McCurdy, 'Justice
Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations,' supra note 7. Field's
nephew, Justice Brewer, also has had recent defenders. See, e.g., John E. Semonche,
Charting the Future, supra note 7 at 168-79, 244-45; Robert E. Garner, 'Justice
Brewer and Substantive Due Process: A Conservative Court Revisited', 18 Vanderbilt
Law Review 615 (1965). Useful additional recent studies of the period include W.
Nelson, The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830-1900 (1982); David P. Currie,
'The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests,
1889-1910', supra note 4; and Walter F. Pratt, 'Rhetorical Styles in the Fuller Court',
supra note 13.
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bedrock of High Formalism; now it also appears that a prophetic iconoclast
such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. had his formal moments. 33
Yet so many judges wrote so vigorously on the imminent danger of the
loss of American individualism and the evils of rampant paternalism from
the Gilded Age through the 1920s that it is difficult to choose the best
illustration. My favorite is a West Virginia Supreme Court decision, State v.
Goodwill,34 which invalidated a state law requiring mine and factory owners
to pay workers in legal currency rather than scrip. Such statutory interfer-
ence with the poor man's patrimony, his right to choose how to contract for
his own labor, was held to violate 'the essential distinction between freedom
and slavery; between liberty and oppression'. 35 This preoccupation with
slavery, combined with the assumption of a clearcut binary choice between
slavery and freedom, is typical of the period. 36 Moreover, according to the
Court's president, Judge Snyder, such 'sumptuary legislation' had been
'universally condemned' and recognized as
an attempt to degrade the intelligence, virtue, and manhood of the American laborer,
and foist upon the people a paternal government of the most objectionable character,
because it assumes that the employer is a knave, and the laborer an imbecile. 37
33. See, e.g., Walton H. Hamilton, 'On Dating Mr. Justice Holmes', 9 University of
Chicago Law Review 1, 10, 15, 26-29 (1941); Yosal Rogat, 'Mr. Justice Holmes: A
Dissenting Opinion', 15 Stanford Law Review 3, 254 (1962-63); Yosal Rogat and
James M. O'Fallon, 'Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion-The Speech Cases',
36 Stanford Law Review 1349 (1984); Saul Touster, 'Holmes a Hundred Years Ago:
The Common Law and Legal Theory', 10 Hofstra Law Review 673 (1982); Robert W.
Gordon, 'Holmes's Common Law as Legal and Social Science', supra note 10; Grant
Gilmore, The Ages of American Law, supra note 6 at 48-56. See also Herman Belz,
'The Constitution in the Gilded Age: The Beginnings of Constitutional Realism in
American Scholarship', 13 American Journal of Legal History 110 (1969).
34. 33 W. Va. 179 (1889).
35. Ibid. at 183.
36. For example, Eugene V. Debs constantly instructed workers that they actually were
wage slaves, perhaps not as well off as slaves had been in the South. See, e.g., Bernard
J. Brommel, Eugene V. Debs (Chicago, 1978) 49, 61-63, 80. Similarly, Upton Sinclair
was commissioned to do a study of wage slavery in the meatpacking industry, resulting
in The Jungle (1906). For similar concern about slavery, from a very different
perspective, see generally Arnold M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law:
Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887-1895 (Ithaca, 1960). In this way, the rhetoric of the
period was reminiscent of the tone of the American Revolution. See Bernard Bailyn,
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, 1967).
37. State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 186 (1889). To illustrate 'universal condemnation',
Snyder relied on Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431 (1886) which found
Pennsylvania's similar statute to be 'utterly unconstitutional and void' since it was 'an
insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only
degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States'.
Snyder also cited Millett v. Illinois, 117 I11. 294 (1886), which invalidated legislation
requiring owners to weigh coal fairly and pay miners accordingly. Snyder could have
cited many other contemporary decisions. See generally Twiss, Lawyers and the
Constitution, supra note 7.
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Such regulation interfered with the 'natural law of supply and demand',
Snyder asserted, and was an effort to have the government 'do for its people
what they can do for themselves'. 38
The United States Supreme Court never went quite as far as the West
Virginia Court in denouncing legislative efforts to protect the populace.
Even the well-known statements of Justice Brewer, for example, who wrote
that, '[t]he paternal theory of government is to me odious', and that
'Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward was in fact nearer than a dream',
tended to be in dissent. 39 The more dramatic exclamations by the Justices
usually were delivered in speeches off the bench. 40 Nevertheless, in the
relatively obscure decisions I will consider, Brewer and his fellow Justices
did a great deal both in their reasoning and their results to suggest that there
is something to the stereotyped view of the Supreme Court as a bastion of
laissez-faire ideology.41
Two forgotten 1890 decisions provide a good introduction to the Fuller
Court's inconsistency between its proclamations and its actions concerning
paternalism. In opinions written by Brewer, a unanimous court upheld two
convictions for desertion from the Army. One case involved someone too
young to enlist and the other a man too old. Brewer argued that a contract
to join the Army changed an individual's status and that his new status
became irreversible. 42 In In re Morrissey, a habeas corpus petition alleged
that a seventeen year-old enlisted without his mother's consent, although her
consent clearly was required by federal statute. Brewer reasoned that the
statutory provision was 'for the benefit of the parent', and therefore 'the
38. Ibid. at 184.
39. Both statements by Justice Brewer were in his dissent in Budd v. New York, 143 U.S.
517, 551 (1892). Brewer also insisted that New York went too far in regulating prices
at a grain elevator, because '[t]he utmost possible liberty to the individual and the
fullest protection to him and his property is both the limitation and duty of
government'. Ibid. at 551. Rufus Peckham, who was soon to join the U.S. Supreme
Court, had much the same thing to say for the New York Court of Appeals in the Budd
case.
40. See, e.g., the speeches by Field, Brewer and Brown discussed in Arnold M. Paul,
Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law, supra note 38 at 63-64, 70-72, 84-85. See
also John Chipman Gray's attack on paternalism and socialism, which Gray saw
exemplified in the spendthrift trust, discussed in Gregory S. Alexander, 'The Dead
Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century', 37 Stanford Law Review 1189,
1244-47 (1985).
41. Charles Warren found overwhelming evidence that Lochner was atypical. Charles
Warren, 'The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court', 13 Columbia Law
Review 294, 295 (1913). See supra note 12. For a very different view, see Roscoe
Pound, 'Law in Books and Law in Action', 44 American Law Review 12 (1910).
42. This idea of status created by contract evokes feudalism and rather starkly reverses Sir
Henry Maine's famous aphorism. Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law (London, 5th ed.
1873) 165.
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statute simply gives no privilege to the minor'.43 In In re Grimley, Brewer
reversed two lower courts that had granted habeas relief to a forty year-old
Irish immigrant who never actually served in the Army and who enlisted
without appropriate procedures, but who still faced a six month sentence for
desertion. 4 Grimley was well over the statutory maximum age when he
enlisted, and he had immediately changed his mind about the army in
response to entreaties from his grief-stricken mother. Brewer responded
with a revealing hypothetical from the formal law of contract he found
'worthy of notice'. 45 Suppose, Brewer argued, 'B' lied about his identity in
order to contract with 'A', after A had advertised for 'a person of
Anglo-Saxon descent' .46 It was obvious and analogous, said Brewer, that
'where a party is sui juris, without any disability to enter into the new
relation' 47 his contract for enlistment became a one way street, benefiting
the government. Therefore, neither B, who lied about his race in Brewer's
hypothetical, nor poor old Grimley, could revoke.
Once the parties agreed to a contract, therefore, iron legal rules assured
enforcement. The Grimley and Morrissey decisions were not much noticed.
Yet their interstitial pronouncements are illuminating, and quite consistent
with laissez-faire values, even as they demonstrate the familiar but odd
connection between reverence for individual autonomy and the great
deference accorded to both the objective legitimacy of legal rules and the
power of the military arm of the federal government.
Some of the most striking decisions of the Fuller Court comport with this
formalistic approach. In upholding the exclusion of Chinese aliens, for
example, despite obvious abrogation of treaty obligations and blatant
procedural abuses, the Court explicitly accorded Congress unbounded
power.48 Similarly, Justice Brewer invoked the broadest kind of inherent
federal power to meet 'the duty to secure rights to all citizens' by validating
President Cleveland's use of 'the strong arm' of federal troops to put down
43. In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157, 199 (1890). William Howard Taft signed the briefs as
U.S. Solicitor General.
44. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
45. Ibid. at 150.
46. Ibid. at 151.
47. Ibid. at 153.
48. Congress first acted to exclude the Chinese in 1882. Its power to do so was upheld in
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The Court afforded Congress
unqualified discretion in upholding the Geary Act of May 5, 1892 in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). Brewer, Field and Fuller dissented and Brewer's
dissent, while showing little sympathy for 'the obnoxious Chinese', is a good example
of his penchant for arguing that questions of degree provided an impermissible basis for
legislation. Ibid. at 742. But see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
See generally Robert McClellan, The Heathen Chinese (Columbus, 1971); Charles J.
McClain, Jr., 'The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in 19th-Century America: The
Unusual Case of Baldwin v. Franks', Law and History Review 3 (1985) 349.
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the Pullman strike of 1894.4 9 It was Justice Peckham who stretched inherent
national power to the point that it supported the President's authority to
condemn private property in order to preserve the Gettysburg battlefield.50
Within three years of its restrictive decision in United States v. E.C. Knight
Co. ,51 the Court referred to notions of inherent power and obligation derived
from morality and honor to sustain congressional power to pay price
supports for sugar.52
The Court was far less bold, however, in its construction of the thirteenth
amendment, and in its interpretation of federal power in statutes premised
upon the enforcement section of that amendment. The Court's explanations
for its restrictive approach relate directly to the issue of whether protection
inevitably involves disability.
II. Paternal Consideration: Action and Inaction
Before I consider thirteenth amendment challenges to Draconian enforce-
ment of contract law in cases not explicitly concerned with race, several
aspects of Plessy v. Ferguson53 merit consideration. These generally are
overlooked amid outrage at the equal protection language and holding in
Plessy that legitimized deference to racial classifications.
Homer Plessy had attacked Louisiana's law separating the races on
streetcars because, he claimed, that law imposed a badge of slavery
forbidden by the thirteenth amendment. Rejecting his claim, Justice Henry
B. Brown explained that any stigma involved in the required separation was
entirely in the eyes of the beholder. Brown also asserted that it was 'too clear
for argument' that the thirteenth amendment abolished nothing but slavery,
bondage, and at least 'the control of the labor and services of one man for
the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his
own person, property and services' .54 Obviously, this definition of servitude
49. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586, 582 (1895). The position ultimately vindicated in the
Debs case, of course, was that of George Pullman, whose relations with his workers in
his town of Pullman, Illinois may have made him the foremost paternalist of the day.
50. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway, 160 U.S. 688 (1896).
51. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). As constitutional law students still learn, the Court attempted to
draw an impossible line between manufacturing and commerce, and thereby deter-
mined that Congress could not reach the Sugar Trust, though it controlled 98% of the
nation's sugar.
52. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427 (1896). For additional illustrations of
judicial willingness to uphold broad national power, see, e.g., South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (upholding federal tax of state agent selling alcoholic
beverages); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (upholding statute prohib-
iting coloring oleomargarine to resemble butter).
53. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
54. Ibid. at 542.
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might be expanded or contracted in future decisions, but it is noteworthy that
even in Plessy the Court conceded that the thirteenth amendment could
forbid at least some coercive labor contracts.
In explaining why the fourteenth amendment's goal-'undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law' 55-did not
reach segregated public transportation, Brown may well have relished the
opportunity to invoke a famous Massachusetts decision by Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw. Born in Massachusetts himself, Brown explained that
Roberts v. City of Boston56 came from a state 'where the political rights of
the colored race have been longest and most earnestly endorsed'. 57 Yet
Shaw had written:
But, when this great principle [of equal protection] comes to be applied to the actual and
various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, that men and
women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that children
and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment;
but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally
entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and
security. 58
It is likely that the Plessy majority neither detected any irony in, nor
intended to affirm, Shaw's sentiment that the 'rights of all' are 'equally
entitled to paternal consideration'. Yet C. Vann Woodward may not have
exaggerated when he termed the bridge between the opinions of Shaw and
Brown 'the most fascinating paradox in American jurisprudence' .59 For our
55. Ibid. at 544.
56. Ibid., quoting 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209-10 (1849).
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Roberts case, see Leonard W. Levy,
The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw (Cambridge, 1957) 109-17.
The positive flavor of Shaw's reference to 'paternal consideration and protection of the
law' had been transmuted over the ensuing half century. By 1896, paternalism was
anathema. In private law, however, remnants of the old affirmative aspects of paternal
consideration survived. A good and revealing example appears in a fairly typical
summation of the Law of Persons by Brigadier General Norman L. Lieber, son of the
first famous American jurisprudent, Francis Lieber, in 'The Supreme Court on the
Military Status', 31 American Law Review 342, 353 (1897). Lieber wrote:
The status of a person is his legal position or condition . . . . The term is chiefly
applied to persons under disability, or persons who have some peculiar condition
which prevents the general law from applying to them in the same way as it does
to ordinary persons. The question of status is of importance in jurisprudence,
because it is generally treated as a basis for the classification of law, according as
it applies to ordinary persons (general law, normal law, law of things), or to
persons having a status, i.e., a disability or peculiar legal condition, such as
infants, married women, lunatics, convicts, bankrupts, aliens, public officers, etc.
(particular law, abnormal law, law of persons).
59. C. Vann Woodward, 'The Case of the Louisiana Traveler', in John A. Garraty, ed.,
Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution (New York, 1975) 145, 155.
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purposes, that paradox connects Shaw's apparent endorsement of paternal-
ism and Brown's abhorrence of the possible use of federal constitutional
principles against folkways.
Robertson v. Baldwin: Protecting Sailors
Within a year of Plessy, in another case involving the thirteenth amend-
ment, Brown again wrote for the Court over a vigorous dissent by John M.
Harlan. In Robertson v. Baldwin,60 three white seamen challenged an 1872
federal statute under which they were detained for deserting ship and for not
following orders. 6' From the 'somewhat meager' 62 record, it appeared that
the men signed shipping orders for an overseas voyage of uncertain desti-
nation. When they abandoned ship, an Oregon justice of the peace imprisoned
them for sixteen days until the Arago was again ready to sail. Then, when
the trio refused an order to 'turn to', the three were charged with refusing to
work and a federal marshal imprisoned then in San Francisco.
Seeking release through habeas corpus, the seamen claimed that the two
periods of confinement amounted to enforcement of involuntary servitude.
The Court's holding was that the seamen, who voluntarily signed shipping
orders, could not complain that their service had become involuntary. The
thirteenth amendment did not interfere with an individual's freedom to
'contract for the surrender of his personal liberty for a definite time and for
a recognized purpose', 63 even if it meant subordinating his will. Brown used
a vast array of historical sources-a veritable tour deforce of the worst kind
of law office history-to prove that imprisonment was merely a modern
example of the time-honored legal tradition of protecting sailors from
themselves. Brown.explained this ancient, abiding paternalistic commit-
ment as follows:
Seamen are treated by Congress ... as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility
for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults, and as needing the protection of the
law in the same sense in which minors and wards are entitled to the protection of their
parents and guardians. 64
In fact, Brown went so far as to assert that '[tihe ancient characterization of
seamen as "wards of admiralty" is even more accurate now than it was
formerly' .65
60. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
61. The Shipping Commissioners' Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 243.
62. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 276 (1897).
63. Ibid. at 280.
64. Ibid. at 287. In the course of his historic essay, Brown drew from the ancient Rhodians
through the Rules of Oleron promulgated during the reign of Henry III to French,
German and Dutch law. What he omitted, however, was that the then-current law of
England apparently would not have permitted the imprisonment at issue. Additionally,
the American law from 1790 to 1872 also made no such provision. Finally, one of the
essential preconditions in many of his examples-knowledge of the duration and
destination of the voyage-was not present in Robertson v. Baldwin.
65. Ibid. at 287.
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Still, Brown did not reach the extreme position of Solicitor General
Holmes Conrad, who argued that, like soldiers, seamen 'cease to be
independent, separate and distinct beings' 66 once they contract for service.
They change their status, he asserted, and become mere 'integers' and 'parts
of a machine'. 67 Yet Brown chose to celebrate the 1872 amendments that
added imprisonment to the 1790 Seaman's Act; he considered these
provisions to be legislation designed to protect seamen 'as far as possible,
against the consequences of their own ignorance and improvidence' .68
In his scathing dissent, Harlan foresaw advertisements for fugitive
seamen replicating those for fugitive slaves. He dismissed Brown's histor-
ical citations as products of earlier times 'when no account was taken of man
as man'.69 Harlan said the thirteenth amendment forbade any compulsion to
serve another in private business. He agreed that seamen were generally
ignorant and improvident, but argued that this compelled increased solici-
tude by courts. Harlan sharply rejected the idea that protecting seamen could
include the use of force to compel seamen to render personal service. 70 In
Robertson v. Baldwin, one man's version of needed protection proved to be
another's idea of involuntary servitude; the distinction made a constitutional
difference.
Indian Wards
American Indians traditionally presented a special case for paternalism.
The crux of the Reservation Indian problem, according to Harvard Law
School's James Bradley Thayer, was that Indians were 'A People Without
Law' .71
In two Atlantic Monthly articles in 1891, Thayer provided a compelling
review of abuses and misconceived attempts at Indian aid. He stressed that
the federal government now owed an affirmative duty to the Indians and
66. Brief for Appellee at 10, Robertson.
67. Ibid.
68. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 293 (1897).
69. Ibid. at 303.
70. By the end of 1898, Congress had adopted Harlan's views in the White Act, which
eliminated all imprisonment for desertion, except for a one-month maximum for
desertion in foreign ports not vigorously opposed by the sailors' unions, and regulated
the seaman's diet and the contract allotment system with great specificity. 55th
Congress, 3d Sess., 30 Stat. 755 (1898). See also Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S.
169 (1903). I benefited a great deal from an excellent paper by Ronnie Sussmann about
Robertson v. Baldwin and earlier cases involving sailors and their 'care' (unpublished
manuscript, 1982).
71. This is the title of two articles Thayer wrote in Atlantic Monthly 540 and 676 (Oct.,
Nov. 1891). But see, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne
Way, (Norman, 1941); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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insisted that 'the mere neglect or refusal to act is itself action, and action of
the worst kind'. 72
The Supreme Court had acknowledged the mess Thayer described even
before Fuller arrived. In United States v. Kagama, for example, Justice
Gray emphasized the extreme dependence of Indian tribes on the federal
government, the problem of local hostility, and the great extent to which the
'very weakness and helplessness' of the Indians was itself 'due to the course
of dealing of the federal government with them'. 73
The Fuller and White courts wrestled and lost many bouts with the need
to define the 'duty of protection' endorsed by Thayer and Gray. Matters
were complicated further by the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, which was
premised on the assumption that in their tribal units the Indians lacked the
'selfishness which is at the bottom of civilization'. 7 The Severalty Act
attempted to use Congress's absolute control over Indian affairs to force
individual property holding by breaking up the tribes and allotting their land
to be held in trust by the federal government. It produced dozens of Supreme
Court decisions further clouding the issue of Indian status. The Court often
changed direction, in part because the Justices struggled constantly to
maintain a vision of completely separate spheres of state and federal
sovereignty. 75
The only Indian case that I have found which raised a thirteenth
amendment claim, however, was United States v. Choctaw Nation.76 This
strange controversy was the culmination of forty years of dispute between
the federal government, several tribes, and their former black slaves. The
72. Ibid. at 678.
73. 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886). In Kagama protection concerned federal jurisdiction
over seven major crimes, when committed on Indian reservations.
74. Dawes is quoted in A. Debo, And Still the Waters Run 21-22 (1940). Upon returning
from a visit to the Cherokee nation in 1886, Dawes noted that there was not a pauper
in the nation and the nation owed no debts. They had schools and hospitals. 'Yet the
defect of the system was apparent ... [T]here is no enterprise to make your home any
better than that of your neighbors'.
75. Perhaps the most revealing decision concerning the Severalty Act was an opinion
written by Justice Brewer, In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905). Brewer used the tenth
amendment to hold that Congress could not regulate the sale of liquor to a former
member of the Kickapoo tribe who was now an allottee. He stated that Congress 'is
under no constitutional obligation to perpetually continue the relationship of guardian
and ward. It may at any time abandon its guardianship and leave the ward to assume
and be subject to all the privileges and burdens of one suijuris. And it is for Congress
to determine when and how that relationship of guardianship shall be abandoned'. Ibid.
at 499. See generally Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West
1846-1890 (Albuquerque, 1984); Russel L. Barsh and James Y. Henderson, The
Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty (Berkeley, 1980); Wilcomb E. Washburn,
Red Man's Land/White Man's Law (New York, 1970); Daniel F. Littlefield, The
Cherokee Freedman (Westport, 1978). I benefited a great deal from an excellent paper
by Despena Lee Fillios on Heff and related matters (unpublished manuscript, 1980).
76. 193 U.S. 115 (1904).
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Choctaw and Chickasaw joined the Confederate side in the Civil War. When
the tribes signed treaties with the federal government in 1866, they agreed
not only to free their slaves, but also to give them the option of being
adopted and, thereby, of sharing the rights of tribe members, including
suffrage and forty acres of land each. The United States was to hold
$300,000 in trust and to subtract payments to freed slaves who opted to
leave the reservations rather than to join the tribes.
The Choctaw themselves had been before the Court in 1886, arguing that
a formal release which they had signed and which purportedly waived
federal treaty obligations dating from Andrew Jackson's presidency could
not be binding, since the Choctaw signed under the duress of dire necessity.
Plaintiffs' attorney Samuel Shellabarger cited several Supreme Court
decisions to support the idea that, under such circumstances, legal formal-
ities would yield to equitable considerations. 77 The federal government's
brief responded that forcing the Indians to remove across the Mississippi in
violation of the earlier agreement was prompted not by 'lust of territory' but
rather by 'a sincere desire to accomplish what was best for the Indian and the
white man, by eliminating the disturbing element that would live in
savagery, and planting it where it would be untrammeled by even the
proximity of civilization, neither molesting nor being molested' .78
In deciding that 1886 case, the Supreme Court noted that the relation of
the federal government to the Choctaw was one 'between a superior and
inferior, whereby the latter is placed under the care and control of the
former'. 79 The United States owed Indians 'care and protection'. Accord-
ingly, the Court abjured the 'technical rules' that would use the release the
Indians signed to defeat their claims and relied instead on 'that larger reason
which constitutes the spirit of the law of nations' .80
Now, in 1904, former black slaves and their descendants were before the
Court, trying to hold the Choctaws to treaty obligations. The federal
government took the side of the blacks, but sought only to purchase land for
them with the $300,000, and did not claim that the United States had
fulfilled its part of the treaty.
In a brief opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice McKenna held that the
77. Brief for Appellant at 88-99, Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119 U.S. 1 (1886). The cases
ranged from Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139 (1851) to Graffam v. Burgess,
117 U.S. 180 (1886).
78. Brief for Appellee at 4, Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119 U.S. 1 (1886). See generally ibid.
at 2-10 for astonishing statements about General Jackson's knowledge of and solicitude
for the Indians, and the general theme that they were lucky not to have been massacred,
so they should not complain. See also M. Rogin, Fathers & Children (1975).
79. Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886).
80. Ibid. The Court held that a Senate award to Indians as compensation for land taken by
the federal government was not conclusive, but would be given prima facie effect to
establish the validity of Indian claims in the Court of Claims, authorized by an 1881
statute. This seems one of the rare occasions when even a credible claim could be made
that a Great Spirit of any description sided with the Indians in court during the period.
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tribes need not offer the adoption option. The Court readily agreed to the
freedmen's claim that the Emancipation Proclamation and the thirteenth
amendment freed them and gave them 'all the rights of freedmen'.81
McKenna then asked, '[W]hat is its consequence?' 82 The Court thought
the obvious answer was 'certainly not to invest the freedmen with any rights
in the property, or to participate in the affairs, of their former owners'. 83
Replying to the freedmen's fallback claim to the $300,000 trust fund, the
Court stated that the fund was only for those freedmen who left the tribe, and
none had done so. Although neither the Indians nor the United States had
obeyed the treaty, the freedmen had no rights beyond formal emancipation
from slavery.
This result illustrates rule-boundedness run riot. It is almost a parody.
Because no one followed the rules, the Court reasoned, the blacks who were
least well off necessarily should be left in that position. No other rules could
be found. If the freedmen wished a different result, they should have used
the appropriate legal forms. As a constitutional matter, in the context of
broken promises all around, the 'declaration of universal freedom'84
proclaimed by the thirteenth amendment was interpreted to mean freedom
only from formal, coercive bondage.
III. The Perils of Full Citizenship: Contracts and Peonage
Black citizens soon were sent this message of a restrictive interpretation
of the thirteenth amendment even more emphatically. Unlike Indians, who
occupied a kind of never-never land as permanent wards of the government,
blacks were formally full legal citizens. They often were told that they
should use democratic processes to change things if they wished and that
they should not expect judicial intervention on their behalf. 85
Peonage prosecutions offer a good example. Despite decisions gutting
Reconstruction statutes in the 1870s and 1880s, and actions by Congress to
repeal most surviving statutes in 1894, several federal peonage statutes still
remained. Prosecutions based on these statutes, premised on thirteenth
amendment power, suddenly sprang up around 1900 in the volatile southern
political climate accompanying the rise of the single-party system. The story
81. U.S. v. The Choctaw Nation and The Chickasaw Nation, 193 U.S. 115, 124 (1904).
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1883).
85. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Brownfield v. S. Carolina,
189 U.S. 426 (1903) (Holmes's first opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court); Giles v.
Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), in which Holmes told the black plaintiffs complaining of
disfranchisement that 'relief from a great political wrong, if done ... must be given by
[the people of the State] or by the legislative and political department of the government
of the United States'. Ibid. at 488.
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is told well elsewhere, 86 so I will mention only briefly the Supreme Court's
manipulation of thirteenth amendment doctrine in 1905-1906, narrowing
the reach of the criminal peonage statute to such a fine point that even had
prosecutors been angelic, they could hardly dance their prosecutorial dances
upon it.
In Clyatt v. United States,87 the Court overturned one of the few
successful peonage prosecutions. Justice Brewer upset the conviction of a
brutal white overseer in the southern Georgia and Florida turpentine farms.
Although unwilling to accept the extreme states' rights construction of the
thirteenth amendment advanced by Senator Bacon and Congressman
Brantley on behalf of the defendants, the Court refused to define peonage
more broadly than as 'a status or condition of compulsory service, based
upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master' .88 Brewer emphasized that
debt was the necessary 'basal' condition. 89 Though one might contract to
become a peon voluntarily, Brewer conceded, 'a clear distinction exists
between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering
services in payment of a debt'.90 Justice Harlan, dissenting, found it 'going
very far', in a case 'disclosing barbarities of the worst kind against these
negroes' ,9 to hold that the trial court erred in letting the case go to the jury.
Clyatt was a clear 'go slow' message to the prosecutors, judges, and
victims trying to reform the southern peonage system. Though the Supreme
Court was unwilling to abrogate the thirteenth amendment entirely, as the
construction proposed by Clyatt's lawyers had suggested, the call for
restraint in Clyatt grew louder the following term in Hodges v. United
States.92
Hodges and two co-defendants were convicted and sentenced to the
statutory maximum for their role in a mob effort to intimidate eight blacks
into leaving their jobs at an Arkansas lumber mill. Brewer again wrote for
the Court, but now he embraced a strong states' rights argument and merged
it with the notion that the thirteenth amendment was 'not an attempt to
86. For peonage, see, e.g., Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery (Urbana, 1972); Daniel A.
Novak, The Wheel of Servitude (Lexington, 1978); Benno C. Schmidt, 'Principle and
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage
Cases', 82 Columbia Law Review 646 (1982). For southern politics, see, e.g., J.
Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics, 1880-1910 (New Haven, 1974);
Sheldon Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in Alabama (Princeton, 1969); C. Vann
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, 2d rev. ed. 1966).
87. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
88. Ibid. at 215.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid. at 233.
92. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
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commit [blacks] to the care of the Nation'. 93 Rejecting the argument that
harassment of black workers was a badge or vestige of slavery, Brewer
remanded them to Arkansas law for redress. To do otherwise, Brewer stated,
would be to treat blacks as 'wards of the Nation'. 94 Such a paternalistic
approach was rejected, he explained, because at the end of the Civil War,
Congress decided to grant blacks citizenship, on the assumption that'thereby
in the long run their best interests would be subserved, they taking their
chances with other citizens in the States where they should make their
homes' .95
This construction of the Civil War Amendments was a stark proclamation
of the 'equal chance in the race of life' approach. It flowed naturally from
the Court's distaste for national government intervention. It also reflected
the Court's failure to take account of the brutal facts emerging from studies
and muckraking articles about the labor system in the South. Once again
Justice Harlan wrote in dissent to argue the inconsistency in the Court's
announced belief in the liberty of contract; he pointed to the anomaly of
ignoring the pleas for '[n]ational protection' by 'millions of citizen-
laborers of African descent' ,96 who were denied what he viewed as their
right to earn a lawful living solely because of their race. This failure to
protect, Harlan proclaimed, betrayed the thirteenth amendment promise,
which 'destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and established
freedom' 97 and had 'an affirmative operation the moment it was adopted' .98
The Hodges decision is less well known than Clyatt and the Bailey v.
Alabama99 decision which followed, but Hodges provides a clear demon-
stration of the paradox of paternalism. To protect blacks, it was argued,
invariably was to disable them. In the majority's view, to give blacks the
special protection of national laws was to treat them as wards and, in the
long run, to undermine their chances of successful competition with all other
citizens. Notions of federalism entered the equation, of course, but the
Court's central thrust was to sustain an ideal form of unified citizenship and
to command formal equality for all. In opposing this position, Harlan took
something of a realist's view of the social and political position of blacks.
He claimed, in effect, that blacks could and should be treated as special.
93. Ibid. at 16. Brewer reasoned that since the thirteenth amendment reached all persons,
and since Chinese laborers now had to carry certificates as free Negroes did during
slavery, the thirteenth amendment could not affect wrongs to persons not shown in the
record to be slaves or the descendants of slaves. State law was said to be the place to
go to seek remedies.
94. Ibid. at 20.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid. at 37. This time Harlan was joined in dissent by Day.
97. Ibid. at 27.
98. Ibid. at 29.
99. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
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Ironically, Harlan's Hodges dissent also rested firmly on the very precedents
which allowed the Court to 'Lochnerize' on behalf of a particular judicial
vision of freedom of contract.
Within the next few years, the Court's majorities showed some willing-
ness to limit the Lochner approach. The best-known example was Muller v.
Oregon,'°° upholding Oregon's limitation of the number of hours women
could work in laundries. Muller is famous for the Court's nod toward the
facts marshalled by Louis D. Brandeis and June Goldmark in a brief in
defense of the statute, but it more recently has become something of a target
in debates over sex discrimination. Justice Brewer's majority opinion rested
on factual assumptions that women were naturally 'at a disadvantage in the
race for subsistence' and therefore 'not upon an equality' with men.' 0' To
Brewer and the majority, it was natural to treat women paternalistically.
Unlike blacks, women were not to be considered equals in life's natural
struggles.
Muller's legally permissible paternalism by a state contrasted sharply
with several contemporaneous holdings severely limiting the power of
Congress to regulate employment relationships. 0 2 The Court also sent back
to the lower court an attempt by a group of progressives, covertly backed by
Booker T. Washington, to challenge Alabama's farm labor system.10 3
When this case, Bailey v. Alabama, returned to the Supreme Court in
1911, Bailey's claim of involuntary servitude directly posed the question of
how far the thirteenth amendment might go to invalidate a contract that
appeared to have been entered into voluntarily. In other words, did the
federal Constitution restrict the power of a state to enforce contracts?
Bailey was portrayed as 'a mere pawn' in the reformer's challenge to
criminal convictions for breach of a year-long, twelve dollar per month labor
contract. Ray Stannard Baker publicized 'the unmistakable marks of
ignorance, inertia, irresponsibility' in Bailey's 'dull black face', yet Baker
also celebrated Bailey's victory as 'another bar ... placed in the way of the
strong white man who would take advantage of the weaker colored man'. 104
To Justice Hughes, who wrote for the majority in one of his first Supreme
100. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
101. Ibid. at 421.
102. See, e.g., Lawlor v. Loewe (Danbury Hatters' Case), 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
103. Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452 (1908). Holmes, for the majority over dissents by
Harlan and Day, rejected attempts to 'take a short cut' to get the case before the U.S.
Supreme Court. Ibid. at 455.
104. Ray Stannard Baker, 'A Pawn in the Struggle for Freedom', American Magazine 72
(1911) 608, 610. See also the article celebrating the victory in the New York Age,
January 19, 1911, but also describing Bailey as a 'cipher' who was 'last heard from
slinging hash at the clubhouse, caring not which way the winds of the court blew, so
they robbed him not of his good meals and freedom to break contracts whenever he
listed'.
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Court opinions, Alabama's presumption of criminal fraud in the breach of a
contract, and its law limiting the defendant's ability to testify about his
intent at the time he agreed to the contract, furnished 'an instrument of
compulsion, particularly effective as against the poor and ignorant, its most
likely victims'. 105 Because the thirteenth amendment 'was a charter of
universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color or estate,
under the flag',106 it invalidated Alabama's attempt to enforce labor
contracts in this way. Hughes stated that the amendment prohibited all
'control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced
for another's benefit'. 107
Hughes began by insisting that the defendant's race was irrelevant, as was
the fact that the contract was made in a southern state. Hughes also said he
was unwilling to impute any oppressive intent to anyone in the case.
Nevertheless, Alabama's enforcement scheme would make a barren thesis
out of 'freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity be
based'. 108 It was therefore invalid.
Holmes, who had not approved of earlier constitutional freedom of
contract claims, saw the majority opinion as an encroachment on the power
of states to enforce contracts effectively. 'The Thirteenth Amendment does
not outlaw contracts for labor', °109 he proclaimed. In fact, Holmes suggested
Alabama's scheme actually might aid the laborer, who would suffer because
the majority's decision to remove the enforcement mechanism would limit
the terms of the bargain a laborer like Bailey could make. Holmes
summarized his position as follows:
Breach of a legal contract without excuse is wrong conduct, even if the contract is for
labor, and if a State adds to civil liability a criminal liability to fine, it simply intensifies
the legal motive for doing right, it does not make the laborer a slave. 10
Holmes accused the majority of tacitly assuming that Alabama juries would
be prejudiced. To the contrary, Holmes suggested, fair juries would
sometimes acquit: it was perfectly appropriate for Alabama to leave
ambiguous decisions to juries since 'their experience as men of the world""I
might have taught them that laborers frequently accept advances, work for
part of the season, and then go off to other plantations seeking better wages.
105. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911).
106. Ibid. at 241.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid. at 245.
109. Ibid. at 246.
110. Ibid. This example of Holmes expostulating about 'wrong conduct' is striking; it
contrasts starkly with Holmes's position in The Common Law (1881) and with his
characteristic enthusiasm for the utility of life's struggles. See, e.g., 'The Soldier's
Faith' in Marx DeWolfe Howe, ed., The Occasional Speeches of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes (Cambridge, 1962) 73 and sources cited supra notes 33 and 86.
I11. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. at 248.
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In a sense, Hughes and Holmes agreed that individual freedom of contract
was a paramount value. Their real conflict was over the permissible degree
of government intervention.' 12 Hughes viewed the thirteenth amendment as
an 'overdrive', so that both government and individual power over another
individual were limited by it. Holmes was much more the formalist, willing
to suppose that Alabama juries would be fair and that deference was due the
legislature. Hughes adopted a pose of not looking behind the formal
categories of the law, but he could not avoid seeing 'poor' and 'ignorant'
farm workers" 13 in need of the Court's protection, no matter what contracts
they might have signed. In a sense, while alleging belief in freedom of
labor, Hughes joined Ray Stannard Baker in a directly paternalistic effort to
ensure that the Constitution would protect farm laborers from themselves, at
least insofar as they signed year-long contracts from which no real escape
was possible. Holmes rejected such paternalism, and argued that economics
explained how Alabama's enforcement scheme actually could benefit farm
laborers.
The Court soon extended its Bailey holding to the pervasive, vicious
criminal surety system. United States v. Reynolds"14 was a carefully
arranged test prosecution that challenged an Alabama law allowing employ-
ers to pay the fines of people convicted of crimes and then to keep them
working until fines and costs were repaid. Alabama defended the system as
a humane alternative to the chain gang. The state also alleged the added
benefit of leaving the convict free to choose for himself whether he wanted
to take part.115
The Supreme Court did not find these humanitarian arguments convinc-
ing. In fact, Justice Day noted for a unanimous Court that 'the convict is
kept chained to an ever-turning wheel of servitude'.116 Because the
convict's service was owed to private parties and not to the state, the
thirteenth amendment applied. In a revealing concurrence, Holmes repeated
his objections to the Bailey decision, but went on to say:
But impulsive people with little intelligence or foresight may be expected to lay hold of
anything that affords a relief from present pain even though it will cause greater trouble
by and by. '17
Given this willingness to generalize about an unspecific but obvious class of
people unable to endure pain or delay gratification adequately, Holmes
112. For a provocative discussion, see Benno C. Schmidt, 'Principle and Prejudice', supra
note 86.
113. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) at 245.
114. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
115. See Benno C. Schmidt, 'Principle and Prejudice', supra note 86 at 691-702.
116. U.S. v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 146-47.
117. Ibid. at 150.
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could agree that 'the inevitable' and 'contemplated' outcome of the Alabama
laws should be invalidated. 118
Even the unanimous Reynolds decision demonstrated that it was difficult
for the Court to determine when an individual's freedom to contract might
actually be so constricted as to allow intervention to regulate that freedom.
Within a year, the Court extended the Adair decision and the Lochner
approach to the states in Coppage v. Kansas," 9 invalidating a Kansas ban
on anti-union, 'yellow dog' labor contracts. Freedom of contract remained
sufficiently vital to preclude intervention in labor-management affairs,
particularly when the state's policy suggested redistribution of wealth or
power. Legislation would be struck down as paternalistic when it was
perceived to interfere excessively with equality of exploitation.
IV. The Thirteenth Amendment Takes a Holiday
Thirteenth amendment challenges to involuntary servitude reached the
Court several more times while White was Chief Justice. In the first two
cases, individuals challenged traditional forms of forced labor. The Court
had little difficulty in affirming Florida's power to use its criminal law to
force people who were unable to hire substitutes to work on road crews. 120
Then, against a background of war fever and anti-German hysteria, the
Court disposed of a thirteenth amendment challenge to the World War I draft
in a single paragraph: White scoffed at the idea of constitutional doubt about
the government's power to compel military service.' 2'
At the close of the Fuller-White era, it was somehow fitting that property
owners were the final litigants to invoke the thirteenth amendment. They did
so in a broad attack on post-World War I rent control provisions in New
118. Ibid.
119. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). As Brandeis put it in 'The Living Law', 10
Illinois Law Review 461 (1916), 'In the Coppage Case, the Supreme Court showed the
potency of mental prepossessions'.
120. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916). Justice McReynolds emphasized the long
tradition of mandatory road work. He explained the intention of the thirteenth
amendment as follows: 'The great purpose in view was liberty under the protection of
effective government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential
powers'. Ibid. at 333. Therefore, McReynolds explained for the unanimous Court, the
thirteenth amendment certainly did not 'interdict enforcement of those duties which
individuals owe to the state, such as service in the army, militia, on the jury, etc.'. Ibid.
The person objecting to mandatory road work was apparently white, but it had long
been clear that thirteenth amendment protections were not limited by race. In fact, one
of the test cases in Hodges involved a white convict; the Court also indicated that the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, premised on the thirteenth amendment power of Congress,
could reach a politically-motivated prosecution in a bitter battle among white citizens
in Kentucky. Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
121. Selective Service Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). The Court found that the involuntary
servitude challenge to the draft was 'refuted by its mere statement'. Ibid. at 390.
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York City. 122 The landlords failed to convince the Court that rent control-
and the requirement that they supply heat and water without being able to
raise the rent-constituted a badge or incident of servitude.
In majority opinions in two companion cases, 123 Justice Holmes noted
that the shortage of emergency housing was 'a publicly notorious and almost
world-wide fact'. Perhaps Holmes's attention to facts differed from his
focus in Bailey, as some suggested, in part because Holmes had begun to fall
under the influence of his colleague, Justice Brandeis, and to heed
Brandeis's fact-focused approach.' 24 In the rent control cases, the facts
allowed Holmes to defer to legislative restrictions on the ability of landlords
to make the contracts they chose in the housing market. Holmes's opinions
evoked bitter, rather personal dissents. Three Justices joined McKenna's
warning to Holmes and the majority that they were opening the way for
'socialism, or some form of socialism' which would destroy 'personal rights
and the purposeful encouragement of individual incentive and energy'. 125
Though not involving thirteenth amendment claims, Hammer v.
Dagenhartt26 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital127 provide an illuminating
122. Marcus Browning Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921) (New York).
123. Ibid.; Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (Washington, D.C.).
124. See, e.g., Samuel J. Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis (New York,
1956); but see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (May 16,
1919), reprinted in Holmes-Pollock Letters, 2 vols. (M. Howe, ed., Cambridge, 194 1)
ii: 13.
1 hate facts. I always say the chief end of man is to form general propositions-
adding that no general proposition is worth a damn. Of course a general
proposition is simply a string for the facts and I have little doubt that it would be
good for my immortal soul to plunge into them, good also for the performance of
my duties, but I shrink from the base-or rather I hate to give up the chance to read
this and that, that a gentleman should read before he dies.
See generally Walton H. Hamilton, 'On Dating Mr. Justice Holmes', supra note 33
at 24.
125. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 161-63 (1921). The dissenters bemoaned the demise
of the Constitution, ibid. at 160, 163, and proclaimed that fifth amendment prohibitions
were being violated, though '[t]hey are as absolute as axioms. A contract existing, its
obligation is impregnable.' Ibid. at 163-64. By 1924, even Holmes was convinced that
the District of Columbia had gone too far in proclaiming that the World War I
emergency still applied; Chasleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924). He wrote
for the court invalidating this extension of the rent control scheme. By then, however,
not only was Taft Chief Justice, but President Harding had remade the Court with three
additional appointments. It was the Taft Court which produced what was then a record
high batting average of invalidated statutes, as well as embracing and expanding
precedents that were to be invoked to strike down New Deal legislation in the early
1930s. For surveys of the carnage, see Edward S. Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme
Court supra note 7; Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes, and the Supreme Court
supra note 12.
126. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
127. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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coda from the early Taft years. In Hammer, the Court decided that the
Federal Child Labor Act of 1916 impinged upon the sovereignty of the states
and thereby violated the tenth amendment. The 5-4 majority also found the
Act to be an unconstitutional extension of Congress's commerce power. For
the majority, there was a 'right to thus employ child labor'" 28-and an
apparent corollary right of a child to be employed, here invoked by
Dagenhart as next friend for two of his sons under age sixteen. Congress
simply did not have the power to regulate despite the view that, as Justice
Day put it, 'all will admit' that 'there should be limitations upon the right to
employ children in mines and factories in the interest of their own and the
public welfare'. 129
Concern and care for the child had to remain exclusively with the states
and the parents to whom states might delegate authority. 130 Work even in
mines and factories was beyond Congress's constitutional ken. If paternal-
ism toward children were to be allowed, it had to flow from the proper
authorities. For the dissenters, Holmes pointed to the majority's inconsis-
tency in allowing Congress to regulate oleomargarine, lottery tickets, the
so-called White Slave trade, and strong drink, but not child labor. 13'
During the early Taft years, avoiding paternalism still meant invalidation
of employment contract regulations. 132 Now there was an added wrinkle:
striking down a District of Columbia law establishing minimum wages for
women, Justice Sutherland claimed that the civil disability of women had
reached 'the vanishing point' after passage of the nineteenth amendment. 133
Women should no longer receive special care and protection, but should
compete as equals. Holmes, now in his eighties, disagreed: 'It will take
more than the nineteenth amendment to convince me that there are no
differences between men and women, or that the legislature cannot take
those differences into account.' 34
128. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273.
129. Ibid. at 275.
130. See generally Morton Keller, Affairs of State, supra note 19 at 461-72. Keller quotes
Ernst Freund, for example, stating that parental authority came to be 'power in trust...
the authority to control the child is not the natural right of the parents; it emanates from
the State, and is an exercise of police power'. Ernst Freund, Police Power (Chicago,
1904) 248. But Robert Wiebe makes the point that '[i]f humanitarian progressivism had
a central theme, it was the child'. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, supra note
7 at 169.
131. 247 U.S. 251, 278-80 (1918).
132. See, e.g., Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923);
Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 267 U.S. 552 (1925) and discussion in Felix
Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court supra note 12; Ray A. Brown,
'Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court', 40 Harvard Law Review
943 (1927).
133. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923).
134. Ibid. at 569-70. Justice Taft's discomfort in his dissent, joined by Justice Sanford,
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Thus, by 1923 the Court no longer relegated women to what the Justices
saw as their natural God-given place. 35 Like blacks forty years earlier,
women were now proclaimed to be full citizens. They had achieved suijuris
legal status. The Court claimed that intermeddling through a minimum wage
requirement would violate the constitutional presumption that each and
every individual enjoys freedom of contract.
The Hammer and Adkins decision show that the Court had managed to
come full circle. Just as seventeen year-olds could enlist in the army without
the parental consent that was required by statute, so parents could send
minors to the cotton mills while congressional attempts to intervene were
held unconstitutional. Avoidance of paternalism permitted the Justices to
pick and choose who would be protected, and to what degree, according to
their own lights.
The very indeterminacy of the paternalism concept created a basic
paradox of paternalism during the years Fuller and White were the Chief
Justices. The Court enthusiastically thrust itself into the role of the ultimate
paternalist. Lacking any coherent theory to confine their discretion, the
Justices simply assumed the role of fathers who knew best.
V. Conclusion
After World War I, the Supreme Court was poised to join or even to lead
the country in its quest for a return to normalcy. Had the Justices paused to
assess the status of paternalism when Taft joined them in 1921, they might
have seen that earlier constitutional efforts to confine and control the threat
were inconsistent and largely unavailing. The federal judiciary had not
succeeded in its effort, as Brooks Adams put it, 'to dislocate any compre-
hensive body of legislation whose effect would be to change the social
status'. 136 But protecting individuals and the nation from the dangers of
ibid. at 562, is revealing. Taft clearly seemed to favor the result reached by the
majority, but recognized that the precedents pointed the other way. He wrote, 'I have
always supposed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio' since the Court
had begun 'laboriously pricking out a line' between the police power and liberty. Ibid.
at 564, 562.
135. Compare Adkins with, e.g., MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), in which the
Court upheld a woman's loss of American citizenship when she married a foreigner.
McKenna wrote for the Court: 'The identity of husband and wife is an ancient principle
of our jurisprudence. It was neither accidental nor arbitrary and worked in many
instances for her protection'. Ibid. at 311. He continued: 'There has been, it is true,
much relaxation of it but in its retention as in its origin it is determined by their intimate
relation and unity of interest, and this relation and unity may make it of public concern
in many instances to merge their identity, and give dominance to the husband.' Ibid. at
311. See also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872).
136. Brooks Adams, The Theory of Social Revolutions (New York, 1913) 218.
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debilitating legislative protection was not a cause to be abandoned lightly
and the Taft Court tried to stem the tide.
The mask covering the direct connection between halting paternalism and
maintaining the economic and social status quo had begun to slip a bit.
Holmes even suggested in his Coppage dissent that the Constitution would
not forbid a state to 'establish the equality of position between the parties in
which liberty of contract begins'. 37 Thus Holmes suggested that state
intervention could precede individual contract decisions. This odor of
redistribution probably provoked some of the most vehement fulminations
against paternalism by the Coppage and Adkins majorities. After all, if any
constitutional doctrine seemed settled during the prior half century, it was
the impermissibility of redistribution by government. 13
The conflation of paternalism and redistribution is significant. Today, we
have some sense that politics near the turn of the century was actually the
politics of redistribution, 139 and that state and federal governments have
played redistributive roles throughout our history. 40 Yet there is probably no
more basic strand of ideology-in a country without much of an ideological
tradition-than unexamined enthusiasm for individualism and self-help.
If the Fuller and White Courts provoked criticism at times and even threats
of reprisals, 14 1 the Justices also tapped into a fundamental American theme
when they set out to choose who was a permissible subject for protection and
what legislative initiatives were acceptable. Richard Hofstadter said in The
Age of Reform:
One of the primary tests of the mood of a society at any given time is whether its
comfortable people tend to identify, psychologically, with the power and achievements
of the very successful or with the needs and sufferings of the underprivileged. In a large
and striking measure the Progressive agitations turned the human sympathies of the
people downward rather than upward in the social scale.142
137. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915).
138. The usual first citation for the proposition is Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1875), but the statement was repeated constantly during the Fuller
and White era. The same sentiment appeared in the reports of United States Supreme
Court opinions at least as early as 1798 in Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798).
139. Richard L. McCormick, 'The Party Period and Public Policy: An Exploratory
Hypothesis', Journal of American History 66 (1979) 279.
140, See, e.g., Henry N. Scheiber, 'Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation
by Government: The United States, 1789-19 10', Journal of Economic History 33 (1973)
232; Paul W. Gates, 'An Overview of American Land Policy', Agricultural History 50
(1976) 213; Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
(Cambridge 1977); Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth (New York,
1948); Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought (Cambridge, 1948).
141. For example, the Democratic Party included anti-Court planks in its 1896 and 1900
platforms, and Theodore Roosevelt triggered a movement to recall or restrain the
Justices in 1912. See supra note 13.
142. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, (New York, 1955) 243-44.
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The Supreme Court from 1888-1921 reacted by assuming the role of
guardian against expression of such sympathies in law.
Deciding when to permit paternalism certainly is not an easy task. It can
be difficult and sometimes impossible to distinguish between providing for
people and deciding for them. Yet promiscuous use of the pejorative
'paternalism' interferes with any possibility of creating structures for, and
providing analysis of, crucial distinctions. The Court's struggle to identify
and patrol paternalism, employing a priori categorizations and legal or
scientific ideals allegedly deduced from first principles, became a juggling
act that was hard to sustain while performing 'the giddy trapeze act' of
constitutional law. 143
Some paternalism goes with any judge's territory, of course, and more is
attached to the judicial icons at the Supreme Court. But the Fuller and White
Courts used the threat of paternalism to arrogate an unusual degree of
authority to themselves. The Justices set out to cleave the popular will from
the popular whim, as James Russell Lowell once phrased the distinction. 44
The boundary they sought to establish to contain paternalism provided the
Justices with a kind of constitutional accordion. They never approached a
coherent theory of how to classify litigants or when it was appropriate to
defer to legislative judgments. Instead, the Justices attempted to be the
ultimate guardians of all Americans and American values.
It may be 'a very bad lawyer who supposes that manipulability and
infinite manipulability are the same thing',145 but my point is not that a
number of Justices during this period could probably be called very bad
lawyers. Rather, it is that the Justices' efforts to deploy legal doctrine to
contain paternalism provided particularly effective protective coloration for
the interposition of their own values. Legal values, in turn, both reflected
and helped to form the views of powerful contemporaries.
Through the lens of anti-paternalism, those victimized in societal struggle
had only themselves to blame. Losers belonged in their places if winners
could designate their status as fitting or natural. By seeking to constitutional-
ize what was seen as scientific and necessary, the Justices acted not only in
paradoxical fashion, but with a fashionable scientism that now often seems
tragic as well. Aggressive efforts to maintain a binary constitutional dis-
tinction between admirable autonomy and insidious paternalism character-
ized the Gilded Age through the time of Harding and Coolidge. We may have
learned the lessons of the past so well that we are able to repeat its mistakes
almost exactly.
143. Karl N. Llewellyn, 'The Constitution as an Institution', 34 Columbia Law Review 1,
14 n.28 (1934).
144. This 'happy phrase' by James Russell Lowell is quoted in Charles Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History, supra note 12 at ii: 751.
145. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, 1980) 112.

